Abstract. The formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has firmly developed into a comprehensive body of knowledge, building on a wide variety of formalisms and treating a diverse range of security properties, foremost of which is authentication. The formal specification of authentication has long been a subject of examination. In this paper, we discuss the use of correspondence to formally specify authentication and focus on Schneider's use of signal events in CSP to specify authentication. The purpose of this effort is to strengthen this formalism further. We develop a formal structure for these events and use them to specify a general authentication property. We then develop specifications for recentness and injectivity as sub-properties, and use them to refine authentication further. Our work is motivated by the desire to effectively analyse and express security properties in formal terms, so as to make them precise and clear.
Introduction
uses the process algebra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [6] to model cryptographic protocols. The protocol participants are modelled as independent processes, interacting with each other by exchanging messages. Different roles are modelled as different processes, for example, initiator, responder and server. The use of CSP to model this type of parallel message-passing distributed system has many advantages. The model captures the precise specifications of a cryptographic protocol and is extensible as different aspects of protocol modelling can be included. Schneider [14] takes advantage of this feature and introduces additional control events to help in the analysis. These events, called signals, are introduced in the model in terms of protocol participants and messages. Signals are used to express security properties, especially authentication, which is central to our discussion.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate further into this formalism and strengthen it. We develop the structure of signals and their use within protocol modelling, and use them in CSP trace specifications to express authentication along with further notions of recentness and injectivity.
Our work is motivated by the desire to effectively analyse and express authentication properties in formal terms, so as to make them more precise and clear [3] . Further motivation is provided by Meadows [9] , who notes the significance of the specifica-tion of requirements for formal cryptographic protocol analysis, and suggests three important characteristics for expressing such requirements: they must be firstly, expressive enough to specify useful security properties, secondly, unambiguous and finally, "easy to read and write". In this paper, we present an approach that attempts to satisfy these characteristics.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the trace semantics in CSP in detail relevant to our usage in this paper. Section 3 discusses correspondence with respect to authentication. Section 4 presents our main contribution where we formalise a structure for signal events to specify properties such as authentication, with recentness and injectivity. The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe [8] protocol is presented, in Section 4.4, as an example of how to use these signal events. Section 5 concludes the paper.
CSP Trace Specifications
In this section we briefly go over the trace semantics in CSP. While we discuss this notation in detail relevant to our usage in this paper, we take for granted the reader's basic knowledge of CSP and its use by Schneider [13, 14] to model security protocols; in-depth treatments of CSP are provided by Roscoe [11], Schneider [15] and Ryan, et al [12] .
The trace semantics in CSP allows us to capture the sequence of events performed by a communicating process as a trace and then use the trace to model the behaviour of the process. A trace is a sequence of events tr. A sequence tr is a trace of a process P if some execution of P performs exactly that sequence of events. This is denoted as tr ∈ traces(P), where traces(P) is the set of all possible traces of P. An example of a trace could be 〈a, b〉 where event a is performed followed by event b, whereas 〈〉 is an empty trace. A concatenation of two traces tr 1 and tr 2 is written as tr 1 ^ tr 2 , which is the sequence of events in tr 1 followed by the sequence of events in tr 2 . A trace tr of the form 〈a〉^tr′ expresses event a followed by tr′, the remainder of the trace. A prefix tr′ of tr is denoted tr′ tr. The length #tr of a trace is the number of elements that it contains so that for example, #〈a,b,d〉 = 3. The projection operation, tr A, is the maximal subsequence of tr, all of whose events are drawn from a set of events A.
Schneider [13] uses trace semantics to specify security properties for protocols as trace specifications. This is done by defining a predicate on traces and checking whether every trace of a process satisfies the specification. For a process P and a predicate S, P satisfies S if S(tr) holds for every trace tr of P. More formally, P sat S ⇔ ∀ tr ∈ traces(P) • S(tr).
Authentication by Correspondence
The notion of signals is inspired by Woo and Lam's [17] use of correspondence assertions to specify authentication. This section describes the notion of correspondence and its relationship with the property of authentication.
We define the notion of correspondence as, for some A and B, if a participant A initiates communication with a corresponding participant B then the correspondence
